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On June 7, 2010, Sergio Adrian Hernandez, a fifteen-year-old Mexican 
national, played a game with a few friends in the concrete drainage ditch 
that runs between the United States-Mexico border under the Paso del 
Norte Bridge.1  According to family members and eyewitnesses, the boys
would run up to touch the chain link fence on the United States (“U.S.”)
border and then run back down the incline into the ditch.2  Apparently
under the belief that the adolescents were trying to enter the country
illegally, U.S. Border Patrol Agent Jesus Mesa (“Agent Mesa”) grabbed 
one of the boys through the fence.3  A few of the boys then began throwing 
rocks at Agent Mesa so he would let go of their friend.4  Agent Mesa  
pulled out his gun and fired at the boys from the U.S. side of the border.5 
He alleges it was in self-defense.6  Sergio, who hid behind a pillar of the 
1. Diana Washington Valdez, Suit in Fatal Shooting of Mexican Teen By Border 
Patrol Agent Gains Support, EL PASO TIMES (July 6, 2012, 12:00 AM), http://www. 
elpasotimes.com/news/ci_21016766/suit-mexican-teens-death-gains-support. 
2. 	Id.
 3. Emily Schmall, Border Patrol Faces Ire in Shooting Death of Mexican Teen 
Sergio Adrian Hernandez, AOL.COM (June 9, 2010, 7:26 AM), http://www.aolnews. 
com/2010/06/09/border-patrol-accused-of-excessive-force-in-death-of-mexican-tee/. See also
Terry Grenee Sterling, U.S. Border Patrol Fires at Rock Throwers in Mexico, and Three
Have Died, THE DAILY BEAST (Oct. 13, 2012, 4:45 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.
com/articles/2012/10/13/u-s-border-patrol-fires-at-rock-throwers-in-mexico-and-three-have­
died.html.
4. Terry Grenee Sterling, U.S. Border Patrol Fires at Rock Throwers in Mexico,
and Three Have Died, THE DAILY BEAST (Oct. 13, 2012, 4:45 AM), http://www.thedaily
beast.com/articles/2012/10/13/u-s-border-patrol-fires-at-rock-throwers-in-mexico-and-three­
have-died.html. 
5. Press Release, Amnesty International, Mexican teenager shot dead by US border 
police (June 9, 2010), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/for-media/press-releases/ 
mexican-teenager-shot-dead-us-border-police-2010-06-09. 
6. Alejandro Martínez-Cabrera, U.S. Officials to Visit Parents of Mexican Teen 
Shot, Killed by Border Patrol Agent, EL PASO TIMES (June 3, 2012, 12:00 AM),
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bridge, was shot and killed.7  Eyewitnesses reported Sergio was unarmed, a
fact confirmed recently by video footage of the incident.  The video also 
shows Agent Mesa never attempted to render medical assistance to Sergio. 
Instead, Agent Mesa quickly returned inside the fence to the U.S. side of
the border.8  Sergio died in Mexico. And even though Sergio stood mere 
feet from where Agent Mesa fired the weapon in U.S. territory, current
legal precedent may prevent the Hernandez family from seeking judicial
redress in U.S. courts for Sergio’s death. 
Chief Justice Marshall once said, “[t]he very essence of civil liberty 
certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection 
of the laws, whenever he receives an injury.”9  But it is Chief Justice 
Marshall’s second question in Marbury v. Madison that is brought to the 
fore with Sergio’s story: “[i]f he has a right, and that right has been
violated, do the laws of this country afford him a remedy?”10  As the law
stands for Sergio, the answer is no.  Despite considerable legal obstacles,
the Hernandez family is testing the limits of American constitutional 
jurisprudence as it applies to noncitizens.11 
This Comment assesses whether noncitizens can sue in U.S. courts 
when they have sustained an injury outside of U.S. territory. This
Comment assumes the underlying merits of the Hernandez’s claim that 
Agent Mesa used excessive force when shooting at Sergio.  It will not
address whether Agent Mesa acted in self-defense.  Part II will discuss 
the context of the Hernandez litigation and its claims against the U.S.
Government, its agencies, and employees for the use of excessive force
against a noncitizen.  It will also discuss the legal requirements for bringing 
an excessive force claim under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of 
the Federal Bureau of Narcotics12 for violations of Sergio’s Fourth and
http://www.elpasotimes.com/news/ci_20770760/us-officials-set-visit-parents-slain-teenso
times.com/news/ci_20770760/us-officials-set-visit-parents-slain-teen. 
7. Daniel Borunda & Maggie Ybarra, U.S. Officials: Youth Shot by Border Patrol
Agent Had Record as Smuggler, EL PASO TIMES (June 10, 2010, 12:00 AM), http://
www.elpasotimes.com/ci_15265746?IADID=Search-www.elpasotimes.com-www.Elpaso 
times.com.
8. Primer Impacto (Univision television broadcast June 8, 2010), available at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NRFETM86uAk. 
9.  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803). 
10. Id. at 154. 
11. See Plaintiff’s Original Complaint, Hernandez, et al. v. United States, et al., 
No. 3:11-cv-00027 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 17, 2011). 
12.  403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
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Fifth Amendment rights.  Bivens provides a cause of action in U.S. courts
for damages remedies for constitutional violations committed by federal
agents.  Part III will discuss the direct and extraterritorial application of the
U.S. Constitution to provide standing for an excessive force claim on the
border.  Part IV will explore the viability and obstacles of pursuing a Bivens
claim on the border.  Part V will discuss the possibility of alternative non­
judicial remedies to addressing civil rights violations by Customs and
Border Patrol (“CBP”) agents.  Also discussed is whether existing
international agreements may provide the basis for judicial redress. 
II. DEATH AND IMPUNITY AT THE BORDER
A. Allegations of Excessive Force on the Rise 
There is no question that guarding the border is dangerous work often
requiring split-second decisions and expert judgment.13  Defending the 
border is critical to protecting U.S. citizens and residents from organized
crime, human and drug trafficking, and terrorism.14  In recent years, the U.S. 
Government has dramatically increased its border defenses.  Expenditures 
total more than $17 billion each year on increases in personnel, technology, 
and infrastructure (such as fences and barriers) along the border.15  Over
the past eight years, the U.S. Government expended over $115 billion on
border enforcement.16  According to a recent report by the Migration Policy
Institute, a leading think-tank on foreign and domestic immigration policy,
the federal government spends more on immigration enforcement than 
on all other principal federal criminal law enforcement agencies combined, 
with nearly $18 billion spent in fiscal year 2012 alone.17  In 2012, the  
Government employed over 21,370 CBP agents.18  An additional 1,200 
National Guard troops help law enforcement on the ground identify
13. Ambar Carvalho, Comment, The Sliding Scale Approach to Protecting 
Nonresident Immigrants Against the Use of Excessive Force In Violation of the Fourth 
Amendment, 22 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 247, 264 (2008). 
14. See Philip Mayor, Note, Borderline Constitutionalism: Reconstructing and
Deconstructing Judicial Justifications For Constitutional Distortion in the Border Region, 46 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 647, 649 (2011). 
 15. Marshall Fritz, Safer than Ever: A View from the U.S.-Mexico Border: Assessing
the Past, Present, and Future, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, at 4–7, (Aug. 4, 2011), http://www.
americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2011/08/pdf/safer_than_ever_report.pdf.
16. Id. at 16. 
17. DORIS MEISNER ET AL., MIGRATION POLICY INST., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 
IN THE UNITED STATES: THE RISE OF A FORMIDABLE MACHINERY 9 (2013), available at
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/enforcementpillars.pdf. 
18. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FISCAL YEAR 2012 BUDGET-IN-BRIEF 71 (2012),
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/budget-bib-fy2012.pdf. 
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smugglers.19  The current version of the immigration bill passed by the
Senate allocates roughly $40 billion for the implementation of new border
security measures including the doubling the number of CBP agents,
erecting over 700 miles of fencing, and increasing the use of technology 
such as drones and motion sensors.20  Unfortunately, side effects of the
Government’s massive build up of force along the border are rising 
numbers of mistreatment and abusive conduct complaints against CBP
agents filed by entering immigrants and illegal border crossers.21  Both 
individuals and human rights organizations are demanding greater 
accountability and discipline within the agency in response to these
rising complaints.22 
Illegal immigration into the United States is at the lowest level in four 
decades.23  Yet deadly clashes between Mexican citizens and CBP agents
increased alarmingly in the past few years.24  An investigative collaboration 
among nonprofit journalism organizations named “Deadly Patrols” 
identified at least fourteen men and boys who have died since October 
2009 after confrontations with CBP agents.25 As a result, complaints against
CBP agents for the use of excessive force against Mexican citizens are 
on the rise.26  According to the Department of Homeland Security’s (“DHS”)
 19. Fritz, supra note 15, at 5.
 20. See e.g., Fernanda Santos, Border Security Rule Costs Support, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 26, 2013, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/27/us/politics/border­
security-rule-costs-bill-support.html; Albor Ruiz, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, (June 30, 2013, 
4:59 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/albor-ruiz-new-border-patrol-fencing­
plans-disturbing-article-1.1386569. 
21. See  AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (ACLU), Statement on Human Rights
Violations on the United States-Mexico Border Submitted to Office of the United Nations 
High Commissioner, Session of the United Nations General Assembly (ACLU, New
York, N.Y.), Oct. 25, 2012, at 1, 4–7, available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/121024
_aclu_written_statement_ochcr_side_event_10_25_12_final_0.pdf. 
22. See Press Release, ACLU, ACLU Demands Federal Investigation Into 
Charges of Abuse by Border Patrol Agents (May 10, 2012). 
23. See Jeffrey Passel et al., Net Migration from Mexico Falls to Zero—and
Perhaps Less (Pew Hispanic Ctr., Washington, D.C), Apr. 23, 2012; see also Fritz, supra
note 15, at 8, 11. 
 24. Roxana Popescu, Deadly Patrols: Political Climate, Trust, and Evidence 




 26. See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES,
FISCAL YEAR 2010 ANNUAL AND CONSOLIDATED QUARTERLY REPORTS 32 (2011); DEP’T 
OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES, FISCAL YEAR 2011
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Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties annual reports, complaints of 
excessive of force against CBP agents have steadily increased over the last
three years. There were ten complaints of excessive force against CBP 
agents in 2010, fourteen such complaints in 2011, and nineteen in 2012.27 
Fatal shootings by CBP agents of rock throwers across the border are a
familiar storyline during the past few years.28 According to the Southern
Border Communities Coalition, a human rights organization, as many as
twenty individuals were killed by excessive force of CBP agents since
January 2010.29  The Mexican government claims that CBP agents along
the border killed fourteen individuals in 2012 alone.30  Surprisingly, the
U.S. Government has only conducted one federal investigation into these 
deaths.31  International and domestic human rights organizations castigate
the U.S. Government’s hypocrisy, as it is willing to prosecute CBP agents 
for corruption, bribery, and improper arrests, but refuses to investigate 
and punish claims of excessive or lethal force.32 
In recent years, several prominent international organizations, including
the United Nations Human Rights Committee and the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, have argued that the United State’s failure
to promptly investigate crimes committed along the border permits CBP 
agents to act with impunity.33  In March 2012, the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights held a general hearing on human rights 
violations on the border.34  The Commission expressed grave concern 
over the, 
ANNUAL AND 4TH QUARTER REPORT TO CONGRESS 28 (2012); DHS, OFFICE FOR CIVIL 
RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES, FISCAL YEAR 2012 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 33 
(2013).
27. Id. 
28. See Deadly Patrols, supra note 24. 
29. Border Patrol Abuse Since 2010, S. BORDER CMTY. COAL., http://soboco.org/
border-patrol-brutality-since-2010 (last visited Aug. 30, 2013). 
30. Bret Stephens, The Weekend Interview with Felipe Calderón: The Paradoxes 
of Felipe Calderón, WALL STREET J., Sept. 29, 2012, at A15, available at http://online.
wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443916104578022440624610104.html
31. ACLU, Suggested List of Issues to Country Report Task Force on the United 
States, Session of the Human Rights Committee, Geneva 11–28 March 2013 (ACLU, 
New York, N.Y.), Dec. 10, 2012, at 11 [hereinafter ACLU List of Issues].
32. See Deadly Patrols, supra note 24; see also Letter from ACLU to Tamara 
Kessler, Acting Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 
and Charles K. Edwards, Acting Inspector Gen., Dep’t of Homeland Sec. 17 (May 9, 
2012) [hereinafter ACLU letter] (on file with author), available at https://www.aclu.
org/files/assets/aclu_2012)cbp_abuse_complaint_2.pdf. 
33. Press Release, Inter-Am. Comm’n on Human Rights, Annex to Press Release
36/12 on the conclusion of the IACHR’S 144th Session (Mar. 19–20, 2012) (on file with
author), available at http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/media_center/PReleases/2012/036a.asp.
34. See id.
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Abuses and human rights violations that are committed against migrants by
members of the Border Patrol, as well as about the impunity of such acts and the 
shortcomings in the policies and practices that serve as the basis for prosecuting
and punishing members of the Border Patrol who commit such acts.35 
As a result, victims have increasingly begun to sue federal officers in 
U.S. courts for compensation.  Consequently, courts must reconcile the 
legitimate concerns of the federal government in policing the border with
providing compensation for victims of excessive force by CBP agents.36 
These deaths at the border are tragedies that raise complex legal questions.
This Comment addresses one: when an alien is the victim of excessive force, 
should surviving family members be able to pursue a wrongful death
action in U.S. courts?  The Hernandez’s case raises the issue of “why a 
state should be permitted to violate in one location a right that it must 
respect as fundamental in another location.”37 
Addressing this issue requires the balancing of several sensitive and 
competing interests; the sovereign’s right to defend its borders, the
individual’s right to be free from excessive force, and our nation’s 
commitment to upholding the rule of law.  The Hernandez litigation 
represents the basic tension between ensuring an effective government 
and one that adheres to the Constitution and its tenets.  National security
and immigration lie squarely within the domain of the legislative 
and executive branches,38 and courts must avoid “overly broad or expansive
remedies [that] may chill government efforts and leave the nation
vulnerable.”39 Nevertheless, the judiciary must not abstain from holding
the political branches accountable to their constitutional limits. 
The Hernandez family’s case provides an opportunity to assess two 
underlying issues. First, to what extent do constitutional limits on excessive
force apply when victims are not physically within the U.S?  In other 
words, to what extent does the U.S. Constitution apply extraterritorially? 
Second, if the constitution does apply, should courts enforce constitutional 
limits when the Constitution places authority over immigrants and foreign 
35. See id.
 36. Peter Margulies, Noncitizens’ Remedies Lost?: Accountability For Overreaching
In Immigration Enforcement, 6 FIU L. REV. 319, 325 (2011). 
 37. Gerald L. Neuman, The Extraterritorial Constitution After Boumediene v. Bush,
82 S. CAL. L. REV. 259, 260 (2009). 
38. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 711–14 (1893); Chae Chan 
Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 604–08 (1889). 
39. Margulies, supra note 29, at 319. 
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policy in the hands of Congress and the President?  The Hernandez family’s
litigation, which is now before the Fifth Circuit, highlights the difficulty
of seeking judicial remedies for human rights violations along the border 
under current U.S. law.  The Hernandez family filed suit against the U.S. 
Government, Department of Justice (“DOJ”), the DHS, and its subparts, the
Immigration Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) and the CBP for damages
under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), the Alien Tort Statute 
(“ATS”), and the Constitution.40  They also sued several individual CBP
agents, including Agent Mesa under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents 
of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics41 for violating Sergio’s Fourth and Fifth
Amendment rights. 
B. Hernandez Litigation 
The District Court dismissed with prejudice all claims against the U.S. 
Government and its departments on the grounds that the U.S. had not 
waived its sovereign immunity42 and severed the case against the individual 
agents into a separate proceeding.43  The District Court also dismissed 
the Bivens action against Agent Mesa for lack of jurisdiction.  The court 
reasoned that Sergio was not entitled to protection of the U.S. Constitution 
because at the time of his death he was outside the territorial jurisdiction 
of the U.S. and did not prove sufficient connections to the U.S. as a 
noncitizen to warrant extraterritorial application of the U.S. Constitution.44 
Many human rights advocacy groups criticized the District Court’s 
decision to dismiss the action as undermining the Government’s 
“commitment to ensuring that fundamental constitutional protections of 
due process and equal protection are extended to every person, regardless 
of citizenship or immigration status.”45  Moreover, the same groups claim
that denying judicial redress to noncitizens on jurisdictional grounds
conflicts with our nation’s international treaty obligations.46  However, it
is possible that the Fifth Circuit will decline the Hernandez’s request and
dismiss the action on the same narrow grounds as the District Court, 
because this case not only requires recognition of a Bivens claim in a
40. Plaintiff’s Original Complaint, supra note 11, at ¶¶ 3–6. 
41. Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint at 2, Hernandez, et al. v. Cordero et al., 
No. 3:11-cv-00331-DB (W.D. Tex. Aug. 22, 2011) (citing Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)). 
42. Hernandez, et al. v. United States, 802 F. Supp. 2d 834, 846–47 (W.D. Tex. 
2011).
43. Memorandum Opinion and Order at 2, Hernandez et al. v. Mesa et al., No. 
3:11-cv-331-DB (W.D. Tex. Feb. 17, 2012). 
44. Id. at 5–6. 
45.  ACLU letter, supra note 32. 
46.  ACLU List of Issues, supra note 31, at 12. 
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next context, but also the unprecedented application of the U.S. Constitution 
to the U.S. border. A brief overview of the Hernandez family’s statutory
and constitutional claims against the U.S Government, its agencies, and
several officers will show why a more promising avenue for compensation 
is a Bivens action against the individual offending officer.47 
1. Claims Against the U.S. Government Under the FTCA,         
ATS, and U.S. Constitution 
Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the U.S. Government retains
immunity from suit unless it explicitly and unequivocally consents to be 
sued.48 Only Congress can—by an express waiver in a congressional
statute—abrogate the federal government’s sovereign immunity to allow 
suits for money damages.49 Moreover, the Westfall Act50 protects federal
employees from suit for common law tort claims or constitutional violations
when they are acting within the scope of employment, by transferring all 
claims against the individual officers to the U.S. Government and 
its agencies.51  Accordingly, the District Court dismissed all claims
against Agent Mesa under the FTCA, ATS, and the U.S. Constitution
and approved the DOJ’s substitution of the United States for Agent Mesa 
pursuant to the Westfall Act.52  Once the U.S. Government was the only 
remaining defendant, the District Court dismissed all statutory and
constitutional claims.53  The following summarizes the court’s grounds
for dismissal and demonstrates the lack of legal remedies available to
noncitizen plaintiffs against the U.S. Government. 
First, the Hernandez’s sought to hold the U.S. liable under the FTCA.54 
The FTCA explicitly waives federal sovereign immunity and permits 
recovery for constitutional violations committed by federal employees 
acting within the scope of his office or employment.55  The purpose of the
FTCA is to impose liability on the Government for negligent actions that
 47. See Hernandez, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 838; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006). 
48. See United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941). 
49. See Boyle v. United States, 200 F.3d 1369, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
50.  28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1) (2006). 
51. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). 
52. Hernandez, et al. v. United States, 802 F. Supp. 2d 834, 840 (W.D. Tex.
2011); 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1).
53. Hernandez, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 840. 
54. Id.
55.  28 U.S.C. § 1346. 
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would typically incur liability if committed by a private person.56  The 
FTCA, however, contains several exceptions.  Most relevant here is the
the “foreign country” or “foreign soil” exception, which bars actions
against U.S. Government employees from “any claim arising in a foreign 
country.”57  Because Sergio died on foreign soil, the District Court dismissed
all of the Hernandez’s FTCA claims under the “foreign country” exception. 
For years, some courts allowed actions for injuries suffered abroad 
when a plaintiff could establish that the “act or omission giving rise to a 
tort occurred in the United States.”58  In fact, most courts had held that the
“foreign soil” exception only applies where choice of law principles
would otherwise require that foreign law govern the cause of action.59 
One court reasoned, “[b]ecause FTCA actions are governed by the law 
of the state in which the negligent act or omission occurred, negligence 
occurring within the United States but causing damage in a foreign
country is not barred by the ‘foreign soil’ exception.”60 However, in 2004 
the Supreme Court reversed course and “unequivocally held that the 
FTCA’s “foreign country” exception bars all claims based on an injury
suffered in a foreign country, regardless of where the tortious act or
omission occurred.”61  Thus, the District Court reasoned that the “foreign 
country” exception precluded liability in tort because Sergio died in 
Mexican territory, despite standing mere feet from the U.S. border, where
Agent Mesa pulled the trigger.  Thus, border plaintiffs are unlikely to
prevail under the FTCA given current statutory interpretation of the FTCA’s 
“foreign country” exception. 
Furthermore, while the District Court did not dismiss the FTCA claim 
on this ground, the “discretionary function” exception could also prove
fatal to an excessive force claim under the FTCA.62  Under the “discretionary 
function” exception, the FTCA precludes any claim that arises from,
[a]n act or omission of an employee of the Government . . . based upon the 
exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary
function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the
Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.63 
56.  28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1).
57.  28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (2006). 
58.  Mulloy v. United States, 884 F. Supp. 622, 632 (D. Mass. 1995). 
59.  United States v. Spelar, 338 U.S. 217, 218–21 (1949). 
60. Mulloy, 884 F. Supp. at 632–33. 
61. Hernandez, et al. v. United States, 802 F. Supp. 2d 834, 841 (W.D. Tex. 2011) 
(citing Sosa v. Alvarez Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712 (2004)). 
62.  28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). 
63. Id.
172
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This exception is interpreted by the Fifth Circuit and others to bar FTCA 
suits when the constitutional violation “bears even a tangential relationship 
to discretionary functions and hence to policy.”64  Because the use of 
force by a CBP agent is unquestionably a discretionary decision, the
“discretionary function” exception would most likely prevent an excessive 
force claim under the FTCA.  As will be explained further in Part IV, a 
middle ground solution must be forged, one that provides for expeditious 
punishment for the reckless use of lethal force by CBP agents without 
hampering CBP agents’ lawful use of force in self-defense or to protect 
others.65 
Second, the Hernandez family sought relief under the ATS.66  In  
particular, the family claims that Sergio was killed in violation of several
international treaties, conventions, and the Laws of Nations, including
but not limited to:
The United Nations Charter; the Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation;
the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo of 1848; the Gadsden Treaty Relating to the 
Boundaries of 1853; the Inter-American Convention on the Rights and Duties of
States; and the Inter-American Convention on the Status of Aliens.67 
Under current precedent, such claims are likewise a dead end.  While the
ATS provides federal courts with jurisdiction over tort actions “in violation
of the laws of nations or a treaty of the United States,”68 federal courts 
have uniformly held that a valid exercise of jurisdiction is not equivalent 
to a waiver of sovereign immunity.69  The Ninth Circuit explained that
“any party asserting jurisdiction under the [ATS] must establish, independent
of that statute that the United States has consented to suit.”70  Because  
the United States does not explicitly waive sovereign immunity in any of 
the statutes or treaties under which the Hernandez family brought suit, 
the District Court held it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over all
claims under the ATS.71  As Part V will discuss in greater depth, a bilateral 
treaty between the United States and Mexico could provide the substantive 
64. Margulies, supra note 29, at 331. 
65. George D. Brown, “Counter-Counter-Terrorism Via Lawsuit”—The Bivens
Impasse, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 841, 842, 900–04 (2009). 
66.  28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 et seq (2006). 
67. Plaintiff’s Original Complaint, supra note 11, at ¶ 6. 
68.  28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 et seq (2006). 
69.  Tobar v. United States, 639 F.3d 1191, 1196 (9th Cir. 2011). 
70. Id.
71. Hernandez, et al. v. United States, 802 F. Supp. 2d 834, 845 (W.D. Tex. 2011).
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legal mechanism for a claim against the United States, if the U.S.
Government agreed to waive its immunity for gross rights violations along 
its border.72 
Third, the Hernandez family brought constitutional claims against the
U.S. Government and its agencies for its negligent supervision and selection
of the CBP agents that led to violations of Sergio’s Fourth and Fifth
Amendment rights.73  The District Court spent little time on its discussion 
of the constitutional claims and dismissed all claims against the U.S.
Government in a single paragraph, on the grounds that the U.S. had not
waived sovereign immunity with respect to constitutional violations.74 
Aside from civil claims brought by the victim’s families, the DOJ has 
the authority to prosecute federal employees under federal homicide 
statutes and federal criminal civil rights statutes.75  However, the Hernandez
family most likely chose not to press these claims once the DOJ notified 
them that the agency was not going to prosecute Agent Mesa.  After over 
a year of investigation, the DOJ ultimately concluded that there was 
insufficient evidence to pursue a wrongful death action under either federal 
statute due to the high burden of proof concerning Agent’s Mesa’s state
of mind.76  Even if the DOJ was willing to prosecute, these cases are 
exceedingly difficult to prove.77  As one former U.S. Attorney in San Diego
lamented, there are no cameras, eyewitnesses, or other means to verify 
72. See generally Jorge Vargas, U.S. Border Patrol Abuses, Undocumented Mexican
Workers, and International Human Rights, 2 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 1, 72–83 (2001) (a 
bilateral treaty with Mexico could impose upon the United States an obligation to protect 
Mexican nationals within U.S. territory and ensure greater compliance with international 
human rights norms); Rocio Garza, Note, Addressing Human Trafficking Along the
United States-Mexico Border: The Need for a Bilateral Partnership, 19 CARDOZO J.
INT’L & COMP. L 413, 419 (2011). 
73. Plaintiff’s Original Complaint, supra note 11, at ¶ 5. 
74. Hernandez, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 844. 
75. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Federal Officials Close Investigation into the 
Death of Sergio Hernandez-Guereca (Apr. 27, 2012), available at www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
2012/April/12-crt-553.html. 
76. Id. (The federal criminal civil rights statutes require the prosecution to “establish,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that a law enforcement officer willfully deprived an individual of
a constitutional right, meaning with the deliberate and specific intent to do something the
law forbids. This is the highest standard of intent imposed by law. Accident, mistake, 
misperception, negligence and bad judgment are not sufficient to establish a federal criminal
civil rights violation. After a careful and thorough review, a team of experienced federal 
prosecutors and FBI agents determined that the evidence was insufficient to prove, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the CBP agent acted willfully and with the deliberate and specific 
intent to do something the law forbids, as required by the applicable federal criminal civil 
rights laws.”)
77. Deadly Patrols, supra note 24, at 1. 
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anybody’s story and to prevail on prosecution so “you probably need
more evidence than you would in a normal case.”78 
2. A Bivens Action Against Border Patrol Agents 
With little hope of piercing the federal government’s armor of sovereign
immunity, the Hernandez family pursued a Bivens claim for money
damages against Agent Mesa in his individual capacity for his use of
excessive force resulting in Sergio’s death.79  In Bivens v. Six Unknown 
Federal Narcotics Agents, the Supreme Court created an implied private
action for damages against federal officers who allegedly violate a person’s 
constitutional rights.80  Similar to a personal injury action, a Bivens claim
attaches civil liability to individual federal officials for constitutional
violations committed during the scope of their official duties.81  Many 
scholars refer to Bivens actions as the federal equivalent to a Section 1983 
action, which provides a cause of action for money damages against any
person who commits a constitutional violation while “acting under the 
color of state law.”82  The rationale behind providing Bivens actions, like
that of 1983 actions, is to deter individual federal officers from committing 
constitutional violations with the threat of litigation and liability of 
damages.83  Under a Bivens theory, the Hernandez family contends that 
Agent Mesa is liable in money damages for his use of excessive, deadly 
force against Sergio in violation of Sergio’s Fourth and Fifth Amendment 
rights.84  A review of excessive force claims under the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments should help demonstrate the legal basis for Sergio’s claims. 
In its landmark decision Graham v. Connor, the Supreme Court held 
that “an excessive force claim arising in the context of an arrest is most
 78. Id. In fact, the federal government recently announced that it has opened its 
first ever grand jury investigation into the killing of Anastasio Hernandez Rojas, who 
was tasered to death by CBP agents in 2010.  Elisabeth Ponsot, Web Exclusive: Grand
Jury to Investigate Death At the Border, NEED TO KNOW KPBS (July 20, 2012), http:// 
www.pbs.org/wnet/need-to-know/video/video-web-exclusive-grand-jury-to-investigate-death
-at-the-border/14290/. 
79. Plaintiff’s Original Complaint, supra note 11, ¶¶ 1, 12, 71–75. 
80. E.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of 
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009). 
81. Steve Hefland, Desensitization to Border Violence & The Bivens Remedy to
Effectuate Systemic Change, 12 LA RAZA L.J. 87, 108 (2001). 
82.  42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675–76 (2009).
83.  Corr. Services Corps. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 70 (2001). 
84.  Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint, supra note 41, ¶ 1.
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properly characterized as one invoking the protections of the Fourth
Amendment, which guarantees citizens the right ‘to be secure in their 
persons . . . against unreasonable . . . seizures.’”85  Therefore, “all claims
that law enforcement officers have used excessive force . . . should be
analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its ‘reasonableness’ standard, 
rather than under a ‘substantive due process’ approach.”86 When a person
brings an excessive force claim, the court considers several factors to
determine the “reasonableness” of the force used to effectuate an arrest
or seizure,87 including “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the
suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, 
and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest
by flight.”88 Ultimately, this analysis boils down to “whether the officers’
actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances 
confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.”89 
This inquiry “requires a careful balancing of the nature and quality of the 
intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the 
countervailing governmental interests at stake.”90 
The Supreme Court further held that, under the U.S. Constitution, an
officer may not use deadly force “unless it is necessary to prevent the 
escape and the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect
poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer
or others.”91  Furthermore, any rule that would permit “[t]he use of deadly
force to prevent the escape of all felony suspects, whatever the
circumstances, is constitutionally unreasonable.”92  Thus, where a federal 
official’s use of excessive, deadly force amounts to a Fourth Amendment
violation, the victim may typically file a Bivens action for money damages 
against the federal officer.93  Most courts have recognized a Bivens action 
85. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989); see also Ting v. United States, 
927 F.2d 1505, 1509 (9th Cir. 1991). 
86. Graham, 490 U.S. at 395. 
87. Ting, 927 F.2d at 1509 (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396).
88. Id. at 1510. 
89. Id.
 90. Id. at 1509. 
91. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 3 (1985). 
92. Id. at 11. 
93. Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 421 (1998); see also Tekle v. United
States, 511 F.3d 839, 846–47 (9th Cir. 2007) (use of excessive force by officer violated
plaintiff’s constitutional rights); Ting, 927 F.2d at 1514 (“A police officer who uses more
force than is reasonably necessary to effect a lawful arrest commits a battery upon the 
person arrested[.]”).
176
HUNTER (DO NOT DELETE OR ADD TEXT HERE) 1/27/2015 4:30 PM      
  










   
















[VOL. 15:  163, 2013] Breaking Legal Ground: A Bivens Action 
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.
against federal law enforcement for use of “excessive force,” regardless
of whether the victim is a citizen or not.94 
While the Supreme Court clearly stated that an excessive force claim 
“is most properly characterized as one invoking the protections of the 
Fourth Amendment,”95 it is not as clear that the Supreme Court meant to 
foreclose a claim of excessive force under the Fifth Amendment when 
the Fourth Amendment does not apply.  Amici to the Hernandez litigation 
contend that an alternative, and equally justifiable, interpretation of Graham
would permit an excessive force claim against the Agent Mesa under the 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.96  The language of the Fifth
Amendment also differs from the Fourth Amendment in one key respect:
it is less geographically limited. Rather than referring to concrete things 
on U.S. soil like “persons, houses, papers, and effects,”97 the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment protects all persons against the arbitrary
deprivation of life. 
III. “STANDING” ON THE BORDER: EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION 
OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION TO THE BORDER ZONE
The Supreme Court has long recognized that U.S. Constitution protects 
the individual, including noncitizens, from physically abusive governmental 
conduct, either under the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against 
unreasonable seizures of the person,98 or the Eighth Amendment’s ban
on cruel and unusual punishments.99  It has likewise recognized that
“certain constitutional protections . . . are unavailable to aliens outside our 
geographic borders.”100  Consequently, before a noncitizen can bring a
Bivens action, the plaintiff must first establish that he has standing to
bring a constitutional tort claim.  In other words, the court must first find
 94. See Castaneda v. United States, 546 F.3d 682, 685–87 (9th Cir. 2008); see 
also Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618, 622 (5th Cir. 2006). 
95.  Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989). 
96. See Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation et al. as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Appellants at 25–28, Hernandez, et al. v. United States, et al., Nos. 
11-50792, 12-50217, 12-50301 (5th Cir. July 2, 2012), 2012 WL 3066824 [hereinafter 
ACLU Amicus Brief]; Plaintiff’s Original Complaint, supra note 11, at 25. 
97. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
 98. See Almeida Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973). 
99. Graham, 490 U.S. at 394. 
100.  Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001). 
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that plaintiff was entitled to the protection of the U.S. Constitution at the 
time the alleged violation occurred.101 
The Hernandez family advanced two legal arguments to prove it has 
standing to pursue a Bivens claim against Agent Mesa.  First, it argued
that the U.S. Constitution governs all conduct occurring with the U.S. 
territory even when those actions are the direct and proximate cause of
an injury suffered outside of U.S. territory.102  Under this theory the
extraterritorial application of the U.S. Constitution is unnecessary.
Second, the Hernandez’s alternatively argued that, even if the extraterritorial
application of the Constitution is necessary, the facts of the case meet
the “practical and functional test” requirements of Boumediene v. Bush
to extend constitutional protection to the border zone.103 
Because a Bivens action is a territorial law that “prohibits . . . a human 
act or conduct that occurs within the nation-state’s border,”104 once an 
individual steps outside of the borders of the U.S., the court must agree 
to apply that law extraterritorially for the action to proceed.105  For years, 
most courts and some scholars accepted the Supreme Court’s plurality 
decision in Verdugo-Urquidez as the prevailing rule on the extraterritorial
application of the Constitution.106  But in recent years, and mostly in the
context of the War on Terror, the Supreme Court revisited the issue of 
exterritorial constitutional rights and discarded the formalist territorial
approach in favor of a “functional approach” in the application of the 
Constitution abroad.107  The question remains whether either theory can 
provide the legal basis for permitting a Bivens action by a noncitizen
against CBP agents for trans-border constitutional violations. 




In Verdugo-Urquidez, the Drug and Enforcement Agency (“DEA”)
collaborated with Mexican officials to conduct a warrantless search of 
101. Martinez-Aguero, 459 F.3d at 622. 
102. See supra Part II.A.
 103. See supra Part II.B.
104. Jeffery A. Meyer, Dual Illegality and Geoambiguous Law: A New Rule for
Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Law, 95 MINN. L. REV. 110, 123 (2010). 
105. See id.
106. Lamont v. Woods, 948 F.2d 825, 834–35 (2d Cir. 1991); Martinez-Aguero, 
459 F.3d at 622; Victor C. Romero, Whatever Happened to the Fourth Amendment?:
Undocumented Immigrants’ Rights After INS v. Lopez-Mendoza and United States v. 
Verdugo-Urquidez, 65 S. CAL. REV. 999, 1002–07 (1992). 
107. Neuman, supra note 37, at 259–66; see also Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 
723 (2008). 
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the defendant’s Mexican residences.108  Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez claimed
the court should exclude certain evidence in his trial because the Government 
illegally seized the evidence from his Mexican residences in violation of 
the Fourth Amendment.  The Ninth Circuit agreed with Mr. Verdugo-
Urquidez and reasoned that “[i]t would be odd indeed to acknowledge 
that Verdugo-Urquidez is entitled to due process under the fifth amendment, 
and to a fair trial under the sixth amendment, . . . and deny him the 
protection from unreasonable searches and seizures afforded under the
fourth amendment.”109 The Supreme Court reversed, and held that “if 
there were a constitutional violation, it occurred solely within Mexico.”110 
The Supreme Court reasoned that the words “the people” in the Fourth
Amendment only applied to the “class of persons who are part of a national 
community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with 
this country to be considered part of that community.”111 As a result, Mr. 
Verdugo-Urquidez could not invoke the constitutional protections against 
warrantless searches when the search took place in Mexico unless he
proved substantial connections to the U.S. 
Moreover, the Supreme Court did not hide the concerns that prompted 
its strict territorial reading of the Constitution. The Supreme Court
cautioned that extending the Constitution to noncitizens outside of the
U.S. could “have significant and deleterious consequences for the United
States in conducting activities beyond its boundaries” and “could 
significantly disrupt the ability of the political branches to respond to
foreign situations involving our national interest.”112  Thus, the Supreme 
Court made it very clear that the Constitution was “never. . . intended to 
restrain the actions of the Federal Government against aliens outside of 
the United States territory.”113  It is against this backdrop that we must





 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 262–63 (1990). 
 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1224 (9th Cir. 1988). 
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 264. 
Id. at 265. 
112. Id. at 273–74. 
113. Id. at 266; see also Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950). 
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B. Operative Conduct and Tort Law as the Limit       
to the Constitution 
Border litigants could argue that extraterritorial application of the
Constitution is unnecessary.  In Verdugo-Urquidez all of the operative 
conduct occurred solely within Mexico.”114  Conversely, the federal agent 
stood squarely within the U.S. territory when he shot Sergio.115  Therefore, 
the Hernandez family and supporting amici contend that because the
Constitution governs all alleged government misconduct that occurs inside 
the United States, the Constitution should apply to Agent Mesa’s actions 
while he was standing in U.S. territory.116  Under this line of reasoning, 
the critical issue is not where the injury occurred, but rather where all of
the operative (wrongful) conduct occurred.117  If the focus were on where a
person is located when he sustains an injury, “Border Patrol agents
essentially would be immunized from civil liability even for truly egregious
abuses of power, based on the fortuity of where, within the space of a 
few feet, their victims might happen to have been standing at the time.”118 
The Ninth Circuit followed this reasoning in Wang v. Reno. It held 
that when the government conduct that violated a noncitizen’s due process 
rights occurred on American soil, the Constitution applied to their actions
even when the noncitizen would likely suffer harm outside of the U.S. in 
the future.119  The situation in Wang v. Reno is distinguishable from the
facts underlying Sergio’s death because the deprivation of Wang’s due 
process rights occurred on American soil.120  However, the Ninth Circuit
rejected the Government’s argument that the court could only review 
actions taken after Wang was brought to the U.S.121  Instead, the Ninth 
Circuit found that Wang’s due process violation was the cumulative result 
of the Government’s actions taken prior to Wang’s arrival because they
“led directly to, and [were] inextricably intertwined with, the ultimate 
violation of [Wang’s] due process rights.”122  All of Agent Mesa’s
 114. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 264. 
115. ACLU Amicus Brief, supra note 96, at 2, 4, 7; Brief of Amici Curae Border
Network for Human Rights, Paso Del Norte Civil Rights Project, and Souther Border 
Communities Coalition in Support of Appellants and Urging Reversal at 4–5, Hernandez,
et al. v. United States, et al., Nos. 11-50792, 12-50217, 12-50301 (5th Cir. July 2, 2012), 
2012 WL 3066825 [hereinafter Border Network for Human Rights Amicus Brief]. 
116.  ACLU Amicus Brief, supra note 96, at 4–5. 
117. See ACLU Amicus Brief, supra note 96; Border Network for Human Rights 




 Border Network for Human Rights Amicus Brief, supra note 115, at *4. 
 Wang v. Reno, 81 F.3d 808, 817 (9th Cir. 1996). 
Id. at 818. 
121. Id. at 817 n.16. 
122. Id. at 816–17 n.16.
180
HUNTER (DO NOT DELETE OR ADD TEXT HERE) 1/27/2015 4:30 PM      
  
   
 
    
 
   
 

























[VOL. 15:  163, 2013] Breaking Legal Ground: A Bivens Action 
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.
conduct123 leading up to Sergio’s death—grabbing hold of Sergio’s friend
through the fence, chasing the boys into the ditch, and pulling out his
gun—weighs in favor of applying U.S. law to his actions.  Accordingly,
because the shot that killed Sergio was fired from American soil, a fact
that the government does not dispute, plaintiffs claim the federal agent is
still subject to judicial review and the constraints of the Constitution for
his actions taking place within its borders. 
In a similar case, the Supreme Court rejected a FTCA claim by a
noncitizen under the “foreign country” exception even when actions by
U.S. officials in the U.S. led to the plaintiff’s false arrest.124  In Sosa v. 
Alvarez-Machain, a Mexican national sued the U.S. Government and 
individual DEA agents for damages because they coordinated with Mexican 
nationals to abduct Alvarez from his home in Mexico and transport him 
to the U.S. to stand trial.125  The Supreme Court rejected Alvarez’s false
arrest claims.  Concerned that “it will virtually always be possible to
assert that the negligent activity that injured the plaintiff abroad” was the
direct result of wrongful conduct in the U.S., the Supreme Court
refused to adopt an interpretation of the FTCA that “threatens to swallow 
the foreign country exception whole.”126  Instead, the Supreme Court 
reasoned that the prevailing choice-of-law principle at the time of the 
FTCA’s enactment required courts to apply the tort law of the place where
the injury occurred.127 Thus, even though DEA agents orchestrated 
Alvarez’s false arrest from their offices in California, the Supreme Court 
found the harm from the false arrest occurred in Mexico.  Furthermore, 
under this interpretation of the FTCA, the “foreign country” exception “bars
all claims based on any injury suffered in a foreign country, regardless of
where the tortious act or omission occurred.”128 
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s decision in Sosa, the facts of the 
Hernandez litigation are distinguishable for two reasons.  First, for-hire 
Mexican nationals under the direction of DEA agents carried out the 
false arrest at issue in Sosa, while Agent Mesa acted alone and directly 
123. The Restatement on the Conflict of Laws has long instructed courts to consider
“the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred” as a principle factor in choice 





See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 702–03 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Id. 
127. Id. at 705. 
128. Id. at 712. 
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used excessive lethal force against Sergio.  Second, the location of where
the injury occurred also weighs in favor of applying U.S. law to Sergio’s 
case.  Unlike the Mexican nationals who seized Alvarez deep within the
interior of Mexico, Agent Mesa targeted Sergio with small arms fire within 
yards of the U.S. border, in the space between the U.S. and Mexican fences. 
In Sosa, Justice Ginsburg agreed that the claim was barred, but
she wrote separately to explain why the majority’s reliance on outdated 
choice-of-law principles was misguided.129  In her view, Sosa involves a
multistate tort action.  Consequently, courts should look to “the law 
of the place where the acts of negligence or the intentional tort took 
place.”130  Under the “last significant act or omission” rule, Justice Ginsburg 
agreed that Alvarez’s tort claim was barred because the last significant
act, his false arrest, occurred in Mexico.131 
Justice Ginsburg’s interpretation of the FTCA and multistate tort analysis
might lead to a different conclusion in cases of border torts.  In Sergio’s
case, the “last significant act or omission” was Agent Mesa’s decision to
pull the trigger and fire on children who posed no real threat. This
interpretation may also provide an attractive legal middle ground to the 
current all-or-nothing practice for torts claims along the border132 since 
courts hesitate to intrude upon the political branches by second-guessing 
government decisions.  A “last significant act” rule, however, could help 
courts provide a remedy that strikes a balance between preventing the 
vindication of a person’s rights on “the vagary of where the resulting harm 
occurred”133 and opening the U.S. Government and its employees to a
flood of litigation for discretionary conduct. 
The Supreme Court has never addressed whether its reasons for 
barring tort suits under the FTCA would similarly bar trans-border torts; 
however, there are few a indications that it may not.  The year the Supreme
Court decided Sosa, it also decided Hamdi v. Rumsfeld and Rasul v. Bush. 
Those cases assessed the legitimacy of the U.S. Government’s indefinite 
detention policy and the due process rights afforded to citizen and alien 
enemy combatants.134  In Rasul, the Government argued that the Supreme
 129. See id. at 751. 
130. 
131. 
Id. at 758 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Id. at 760. 
132. James E. Pfander & David Baltmanis, Rethinking Bivens: Legitimacy and 
Constitutional Adjudication, 98 GEO. L.J. 117, 123 (2009). 
133. Border Network for Human Rights Amicus Brief, supra note 115, at *6; see
also Pfander & Baltmanis, supra note 132, at 117. 
134. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 481 (2004); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,
542 U.S. 507, 518, 524 (2004) (“[T]he Government transferred Hamdi from Guantanamo
Bay to the United States naval brig only after it learned that he might be an American
182
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Court did not have jurisdiction to hear the claims of enemy combatants 
detained at Guantanamo Naval Base, which is formally part of Cuba but 
leased by the U.S.  The Supreme Court rejected the Government’s argument 
and held that it could exercise jurisdiction over the detainee’s habeas 
claims because the U.S. exercised “complete jurisdiction” and de facto
plenary control over Guantanamo pursuant to its lease agreement.  The 
Supreme Court emphasized that it was not the individual’s citizenship
that determined whether jurisdiction existed, but rather the person and 
place that held him in unlawful custody.135  Therefore, because the U.S. 
Government detained the prisoners on a U.S. naval base, the Supreme
Court held that presence within the territorial jurisdiction of the U.S. was
not “an invariable prerequisite” to the exercise of jurisdiction.136 
C. Applying Functionalism to the Border 
In Boumediene v. Bush, Justice Kennedy both confirmed and elaborated 
on the Supreme Court’s “functional approach” to the extraterritorial
application of the U.S. Constitution.137 Under the functional approach,
“the selective application of constitutional limitations to U.S. government
action outside U.S. sovereign territory”138 depends on the “‘particular
circumstances, the practical necessities, and the possible alternatives which 
Congress had before it,’ and, in particular, whether judicial enforcement
citizen. It is not at all clear why that should make a determinative constitutional
difference.”)
135. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 478–79. 
136. Id. at 478 (citing Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 
495 (1973)).
137. The functional approach to the extraterritorial application of the Constitution
has its genesis in Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Verdugo-Urquidez. Verdugo-
Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 277–78.  In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy rejected the 
plurality’s narrow reading of the Fourth Amendment’s “the people,” and instead relied 
on Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion in Reid v. Covert to justify a functional approach 
to extending the Constitution abroad. Id. According to Justice Kennedy, precedential
cases like the Insular Cases, In re Ross, and Reid v. Covert, stood for the proposition that 
the “Government may act only as the Constitution authorizes, whether the actions in 
question are foreign or domestic.” Id. at 277.  But only when “the conditions and
considerations are that would make adherence to a specific [constitutional] guarantee 
[not] altogether impracticable and anomalous.” Id. at 277–78 (citing Reid v. Covert, 354
U.S. 1, 74 (1957) (J. Harlan concurring)). 
138. Neuman, supra note 37, at 259. 
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of the provision would be ‘impracticable and anomalous.’”139  Furthermore,
in determining the extraterritorial reach of the Constitution, the Court
considered three factors: “(1) the citizenship and status of the detainee 
and the adequacy of the process through which that status determination 
was made; (2) the nature of the sites where apprehension and then 
detention took place; and (3) the practical obstacles inherent in resolving 
the prisoner’s entitlement to the writ.”140  Accordingly, the Hernandez
family contends it has standing to pursue a Bivens remedy because the
facts of the case justify the extraterritorial application of the U.S.
Constitution under the “practical and functional test” as defined in
Boumediene v. Bush.141 
First, the Hernandez family argued that though Sergio was a noncitizen, 
like the petitioners in Boumediene, he is not an enemy combatant and 
therefore is entitled to greater Constitutional protection.142  Moreover,
“the substantive right at issue here is more fundamental than that at stake 
in Boumediene . . . The right to life is the most fundamental of human
rights, the deprivation of which appropriately receives vigilant judicial
review.”143  Secondly, the Hernandez family claims that “the second 
Boumediene factor—the nature of the site where relevant events occurred 
—also weighs strongly in favor” of extending the Constitutional protections 
because the challenged conduct, Agent Mesa shooting, occurred inside 
the U.S.144  Unlike Boumediene, where the prisoner’s unlawful detention
occurred outside the United States, “all of the challenged conduct occurred
solely in the United States” and “the injury occurred outside the United 
States.”145  Thirdly, the Hernandez family contends that it would not be
“impracticable or anomalous”146 to resolve plaintiff’s claims because
“courts routinely review the Executive’s border-related policies and 
conduct, including claims of excessive force, unlawful search and seizure, 
and other alleged wrongs”147 and it is the U.S. Government’s refusal to
139. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 759 (2008) (citing Reid v. Covert, 354 
U.S. 1, 75 (1957)); see also Neuman, supra note 37, at 265.
 140. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 766. 
141. Brief for the Appellant at 22–23, Hernandez, et al. v. United States, et al., 
Nos. 11-50792, 12-50217, 12-50301 (5th Cir. June 25, 2012), 2012 WL 2513647. 
142. Id. at 28. 
143. Id. at 28–29 (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) and 
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875)). 
Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004); United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S.
 144. Id. at 30. 
145. Id. at 32. 
146. 
147. 
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 277–78. 
Brief for the Appellant, supra note 141, at 34 (citing United States v. Flores­
531, 537 (1985); United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 588 (1983);
United States v. Kelly, 302 F.3d 291, 294 (5th Cir. 2002)).
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prosecute Agent Mesa that is “caus[ing] friction” with Mexico.148 In 
fact, the Government of Mexico filed an amicus brief in support of the 
Hernandez family and expressly stated that its interest in protecting the
well-being of its citizens supports “[e]xtending the requirements of the 
Fourth and Fifth Amendment to cover the actions of a U.S. officer in a 
situation like this [and] would not interfere in any way with Mexico’s
‘control over its territory . . . and authority to apply the law there.’”149 
The Hernandez family maintained that “the U.S. courts’ refusal to 
review U.S. agents’ conduct would create a lawless border area where the
Executive’s police powers—including extrajudicial killings—would be 
unreviewable by Mexico or the U.S. judiciary.”150  If the U.S. continues
to refuse to extradite Agent Mesa to Mexico to stand trial, then any effective 
and enforceable remedy against him can only come from U.S. courts.151 
It is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s holding in Boumediene and 
the doctrine of separation of powers to give “the political branches[‘] . . .
power to switch the Constitution on or off at will.”152 
D. Stretching the Constitution Over the Border 
The Hernandez family argued both legal theories—the direct and the 
extraterritorial application of the Constitution—to justify standing in U.S. 
courts. But no court has ever applied these theories to the border and for 
a court to do so would be an unprecedented application of the Constitution
to another sovereign’s territory and recognition of a Bivens claim in a
new context. Courts hesitant to break such legal ground could be further 
dissuaded from adopting a Bivens remedy on the border by the following 
criticisms and separation of powers concerns. 
148. Id. at 35–36. 
149. Brief for the Government of the United Mexican States as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Appellants at 15–16, Hernandez, et al. v. United States, et al., Nos. 11-50792, 
12-50217, 12-50301 (5th Cir. July 2, 2012), 2012 WL 3066823 (citing Boumediene, 553 
U.S. at 754) [hereinafter Brief for the Government of Mexico].
150.  Brief for the Appellant, supra note 141, at 36. 
151. Id.; see also Press Release, Mexico’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Apr. 27,
2012), available at http://saladeprensa.sre.gob.mx/index.php/es/comunicados/1449-129
[last visited Jan. 27, 2013].
152.  Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 765 (2008). 
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1. Operative Conduct and Modern Military Operations 
Creating a Bivens remedy in the border context is appealing on moral 
and remedial grounds; however, the Court must avoid extending the 
Constitution in a way that would interfere with military operations abroad 
and inadvertently open U.S. courts to a flood of litigation on behalf of 
the world’s aggrieved.153  One context in which the first theory, the direct
application of the Constitution to all conduct within the U.S. regardless 
of where the harm occurs, may have unintended consequences is the War 
on Terror. 
Since 2006, the U.S. military has increasingly used “predator drones” 
to carry out the targeted killing of suspected terrorists and insurgents 
abroad.154  In fact, some organizations estimate that U.S. drones have killed 
2,555 suspected terrorists since the program’s inception.155  Targeted 
killing is the “premeditated killing by a state of a specifically identified 
person not in its custody.”156  These killings are often carried out by 
predator drones, unmanned military aircrafts with extraordinary combat
capabilities.157  These pilotless weapons are controlled and operated
by military command centers in the U.S.158  Under the first legal theory, 
the collateral victim of an erroneous drone strike would be able to bring
an excessive force or wrongful death action against the federal official who 
deployed the drone so long as all of the wrongful conduct—launching 
the drone—occurred within the U.S.159 
While this analogy oversimplifies Hernandez’s legal argument, it 
illustrates that courts must carefully limit the application of the Constitution 
to avoid unintentional legal ripples elsewhere. Without careful 
circumscription of the remedy to the border context, extending the 
Constitution under this theory could allow tort litigation to undermine the 
“Government’s overriding interest in protecting the Nation” abroad despite
the border plaintiff’s claims that judicial review would not open the 
153. Richard Murphy & Afsheen John Radsan, Due Process and Targeted Killing 
of Terrorists, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 405, 441–42 (2009). 
154. Carla Crandall, Ready. . .Fire. . .Aim! A Case for Applying American Due 
Process Principles Before Engaging in Drone Strikes, 24 FLA. J. INT’L. L. 55, 56 (2012); 
see also Murphy & Radsan, supra note 153, at 412–13. 
155. Bill Roggio & Alexander Mayer, Charting the Data for U.S. Airstrikes in 
Pakistan, 2004-2013, LONG WAR J. (last visited Oct. 5, 2013), http://www.longwarjournal.
org/pakistan-strikes.php.
156. Crandall, supra note 154, at 58. 
157. Id. at 59. 
158.  Murphy & Radsan, supra note 153, at 406. 
159. Richard D. Rosen, Drones and the U.S. Courts, 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 
5280, 5288 (2011). 
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floodgates of litigation for alleged victims in other circumstances.160 
Additionally, most courts would not try to redefine a Bivens remedy, but 
would either recognize the claim in the new context or not.
However, most courts, including the Supreme Court, are concerned
about judicial resources and whether their decisions would burden the 
court system with new claims and claimants.  In Rasul and Boumediene, the
Supreme Court’s decision to extend jurisdiction to alien enemy combatants 
detained at Guantanamo somewhat hinged on whether it could limit 
jurisdiction to the prisoners at Guantanamo while preventing a flood of
litigation from combatants (or even non-combatants) in foreign countries 
during a war.  The Court focused on the “critical differences” between the 
German prison in Eisentrager and the Guantanamo Naval Base in
Boumediene to distinguish foreign battlefields, clearly outside of the 
Court’s jurisdiction from U.S. military bases, over which the U.S.
Government exercises plenary control.  In making such stark distinctions, 
the Supreme Court demonstrated its aversion to extending the Constitution 
too far without additional statutory authority from Congress. 
Moreover, there are indications that resistance to opening courts to War
on Terror victims is fading as popular outrage over the U.S.’s prolific 
use of drones for targeted killing operations pushes the courts and
Congress toward more actively policing exercises of Executive war powers.  
Many scholars, country leaders, and inter-governmental human rights 
organizations161 demand that the U.S. Government either stop the “extra­
judicial” killings or provide some form of due process to its intended
targets.162  In his  Hamdi dissent, Justice Thomas argued the plurality’s
due process standards would require the U.S. give a drone strike target 
advance notice, as well as an opportunity to be heard, before being killed.163 
While Justice Thomas’s admonition was “an attempt ‘to mount a reductio 
ad absurdum attack on his colleagues’ efforts . . . to impose due process’
on government actions,”164 it may actually foreshadow what is to come
as increasingly more citizens disapprove of the military’s targeted killing 
160. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 598 (2004); see also Murphy & Radsan, 
supra note 153, at 441–45; Editorial, A Court for Targeted Killing, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 
2013, at A26. 
161. See UN Expert Investigates US Drone Attacks, Targeted Killings Involving
Civilian, FOX NEWS (Jan. 24, 2013), http://www.foxnews/us/2013/01/24/un-expert-investigates 
-us-drone-attacks-targeted-killings-that-involve-civilian/. 
162. See Murphy & Radsan, supra note 153; see also Crandall, supra note 154. 
163. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 597. 
164. Crandall, supra note 154, at 73 (emphasis added). 
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policy.  President Obama announced in his 2013 State of the Union address
that Congress must work to ensure that the “targeting, detention, and 
prosecution of terrorists remains consistent with our laws and system of
checks and balances.”165  While providing a suspected foreign enemy with 
unqualified due process rights may be an unworkable solution and an 
implacable hindrance on the Executive’s ability to wage war,166 providing
due process protections to a noncitizen harmed by CBP agents along the 
border is not.
2. Fatal Flaws to Functionalism in the Border Zone 
The Hernandez family also hopes to establish standing under Boumediene’s
“practical and functional test,” which would warrant extraterritorial
application of the Constitution.167  While a straightforward three-factor test 
is a tempting plaintiff-oriented interpretation of Justice Kennedy’s opinion 
in Boumediene, most courts may not construe the opinion so expansively.168 
Indeed, the Supreme Court indicated that satisfying the three factors alone 
would not guarantee the extraterritorial application of the Constitution in 
all circumstances.169  Still, the functional approach adopted by the Supreme
Court in Boumediene supports the extraterritorial application of the 
Constitution “on a provision-by-provision basis, to territories over which
the United States exercises exclusive jurisdiction and control.”170  Despite
the Supreme Court’s reluctance to extend the Constitution to foreign 
territory,171 a stronger case for the extraterritorial application of the
Constitution can be made when concerns over compromising “military
missions” and causing “friction with the host government” are absent.172 
Admittedly, pursuing constitutional tort litigation on the border seeks 
an unprecedented extraterritorial application of the Constitution to another 
sovereign’s territory.  Justice Kennedy specifically noted that the Supreme
Court has “never held that noncitizens . . . in territory over which another
country maintains de jure sovereignty have any rights under our
165. President Barack Obama, President of the United States, State of the Union
Address (Feb. 12, 2013). 
166. See Murphy & Radsan, supra note 153, at 441–43. 
167. See Part II.C.
 168. See Brief for the Appellant, supra note 141, at 27–37. 
169.  Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 764–771(2008). 
170. Elizabeth A. Wilson, The War on Terrorism and “The Water’s Edge”:
Sovereignty, “Territorial Jurisdiction,” and the Reach of the U.S. Constitution in the 
Guantanamo Detainee Litigation, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 165, 183 (2006). 
171. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Co., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936) (“[N]either
the Constitution nor the laws passed in pursuance of it have any force in foreign territory
unless in respect of [its] own citizens.”).
172. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 769–71. 
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Constitution.”173 At the same time, the Supreme Court stressed that
citizenship is not dispositive of the issue, since “the Constitution’s
separation-of-powers structure . . . protects persons as well as citizens,
foreign nationals who have the privilege of litigating in our courts can 
seek to enforce separation-of-powers principles.”174 As a result, the
Supreme Court in Boumediene focused on where the noncitizens were 
held, rather than what country they were from.
Unlike the “unincorporated territories” in the Insular Cases, or 
the German prison in Eisentrager, Justice Kennedy found that “[i]n
every practical sense Guantanamo is not abroad; it is within the constant 
jurisdiction of the United States.”175  While it is doubtful that the Court
would find that the U.S. exercises the same degree of control over the
U.S-Mexico border as it does over Guantanamo Bay,176 the U.S. arguably
exercises de facto sovereignty over the immediate area between the U.S. 
and Mexico, where the incident with Hernandez took place.  Though it is
indisputable that in the area immediately across the border, the U.S.
would be “answerable” to the Mexican Government,177 the Government
of Mexico stated in its amicus brief that “applying U.S. law would pose 
no threat to principles of comity among nations or to Mexico’s sovereignty 
in its own territory.”178  Additionally, the fact that Sergio died as a result 
of small-arms fire shows the limited geographic area to which plaintiffs 
seek to apply the Constitution. 
Furthermore, courts uncomfortable with applying the Constitution 
extraterritorially could interpret the Boumediene decision narrowly to 
suggest that the Court only settled the question of whether the Suspension 
Clause of the Constitution applies to noncitizens held in its custody and 
within its territorial jurisdiction, and did not discuss other Constitutional
provisions.179  By construing the decision as having left open the question 
of “whether and when foreign nationals who are not in U.S. custody . . .









Id. at 770. 
Id. at 743. 
Id. at 771 (citing Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 480 (2004)). 
 Brief for the Appellant, supra note 141, at 30–32. 
See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 768, 770. 
 Brief for the Government of Mexico, supra note 149, at 15. 
Neuman, supra note 37, at 272. 
Id. at 259. 































   
more readily distinguish the War on Terror context from excessive force 
claims along the border.
IV. BIVENS ON THE BORDER: A BENEFIT OR BUST? 
Since the Bivens decision over forty-two years ago, the Supreme Court
has extended the action to new contexts only twice181 and otherwise the
Court has “found a Bivens remedy unjustified.”182  Recently, the Second 
Circuit declined to create a Bivens action against federal officers and 
policymakers for their participation in the extraordinary rendition of a 
noncitizen.183  The Court reasoned that a “Bivens remedy is an extraordinary 
thing that should rarely if ever be applied in ‘new contexts.’”184  To date,
the Supreme Court has never recognized a Bivens suit against a CBP
agent by a noncitizen outside the U.S.; therefore, creating a Bivens remedy 
for trans-border constitutional torts would be a novel Bivens context.185 
Despite the Supreme Court’s proclaimed disfavor of extending Bivens
liability “to any new context or new category of defendants,”186 recent 
decisions by the Supreme Court in the War on Terror context indicate the 
Court’s willingness to assume a “heightened judicial role in protecting 
individual rights,” as well as to engage in judicial review of Executive and 
Congressional exercises of power.187  In her plurality opinion in Hamdi, 
Justice O’Connor stated:
While we accord the greatest respect and consideration to the judgments of 
military authorities in matters relating to the actual prosecution of a war, and 
recognize that the scope of that discretion necessarily is wide, it does not 
infringe on the core role of the military for the courts to exercise their own time-
honored and constitutionally mandated roles of reviewing and resolving claims
like those presented here.188 
Moreover, the Supreme Court has consistently reviewed violations of
the Fourth Amendment in regards to border policy.189 Although the
Supreme Court often affords considerable deference to Congress’s authority
over immigration policy and the Executive’s control over policing the 
181. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979) (An employment discrimination 
claim in violation of the Due Process Clause) and Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980)
(an Eighth Amendment violation by prison officials). 
182.  Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 550 (2007). 
183. See Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 572 (2d Cir. 2009). 
184. Id. at 571. 
185. Carvalho, supra note 13, at 279. 
186.  Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 74 (2001). 
187. Brown, supra note 65, at 842. 
188.  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 535 (2004). 
189. Almeida Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973); United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975). 
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border, when it comes to constitutional claims, the duty “to say what the 
law is” remains with the judicial branch.190  While there are considerable
policy concerns at play along the border, the Government should not inflate 
these concerns to preclude U.S. courts from adjudicating meritorious
claims of excessive force against CBP agents. 




The twin goals of Bivens actions are (1) to provide just compensation 
to victims of unconstitutional conduct and (2) to deter future constitutional 
violations through the individual liability model.191 Adhering to this dual
purpose, the Supreme Court has extended a Bivens action only when it was
necessary to “provide an otherwise nonexistent cause of action against 
individual officers alleged to have acted unconstitutionally, or to provide 
a cause of action for a plaintiff who lacked any alternative remedy for
harms caused by an individual officer’s unconstitutional conduct.”192 
Both of these rationales are present in the context of excessive force claims
against CBP agents on the border.  First, noncitizens lack both constitutional 
and statutory causes of action against individual CBP agents for use of
excessive, deadly force on the border.  Second, unless the U.S. Government 
is willing to extradite the CBP officer to Mexico to stand trial—which it
has adamantly refused to do—victims of excessive force have only one 
option for redress: sue in U.S. courts. A Bivens action for victims of 
excessive force by CBP agents is the most effective solution for holding
CBP agents accountable and compensating excessive force victims.193 
Once a court identifies the context as “new,” it must undertake a two-
part inquiry to “decide whether to recognize a Bivens remedy in that  
environment of fact and law.”194  The first part of the analysis is whether 
Congress has already established an alternative remedial scheme available 
to the plaintiff, while the second part considers whether there are “special 
factors counseling hesitation” in crafting a Bivens remedy in the new 
190.  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). 
191. Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Success of Bivens Litigation And Its 
Consequences For the Individual Liability Model, 62 STAN. L. REV. 809, 814 (2010); see 
also Malesko, 534 U.S. at 69–71. 
192. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 70. 
193. Hefland, supra note 81, at 107. 
194.  Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 572 (2d Cir. 2009). 
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context.195  The vagueness of what constitutes “special factors,” or when
alternative remedies are sufficient, has drawn sharp criticism from litigators
and scholars alike196 since no court has ever defined the term and the weight
of special factors are evaluated on a case-by-case basis.197  Courts are 
more likely to extend Bivens to new contexts when the facts or circumstances
surrounding a particular case provide an opportunity to apply the twin
goals of deterring unconstitutional conduct and providing compensation.198 
1. Alternative Remedial Scheme 
A Bivens remedy operates like a fall back device whose availability is
determined after the Court evaluates all of one’s alternative remedies.199 
As the Supreme Court stated in Minneci v. Pollard, “any alternative, 
existing process for protecting the constitutionally recognized interest” 
could constitute “a convincing reason for the Judicial Branch to refrain from
providing a new and freestanding remedy in damages.”200 The Court further
suggested that a Bivens action may exist only when an alternative remedy
against the individual was “nonexistent” or where the plaintiff “lacked 
any alternative remedy” at all.201 As previously discussed, a noncitizen
harmed by a federal agent while outside of U.S. territory has no statutory 
legal theory on which to pursue a remedy for excessive force.202  Moreover, 
Congress has not implicitly precluded a Bivens action by alternative 
legislation.203  In these limited circumstances, a Bivens claim is currently 
a noncitizen’s legal last resort.204  Thus, the first prong of the inquiry favors 
extending a Bivens action to the border context.
While it is true that noncitizens may have access to U.S. courts if they
can prove standing under the “substantial connection” test from Verdugo­
Urquidez,205 such a test will be unduly restrictive in the border context.
195.  Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 550 (2007). 
196. See Pfander & Baltmanis, supra note 132, at 141–49; see also Anya Bernstein,
Congressional Will and the Role of The Executive In Bivens Actions: What is Special
About Special Factors?, 45 IND. L. REV. 719, 722 (2012); Margulies, supra note 29, at 
331–33. 
197. Bernstein, supra note 196, at 722, 730–36. 
198. Pfander & Baltmanis, supra note 132, at 141–49; see also Brown, supra note 
65, at 858–61. 





 Pfander & Baltmanis, supra note 132, at 120. 
 Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S. Ct. 617, 621 (2012). 




Bernstein, supra note 196, at 736–41. 
See Part I.B.
205. Atamirzayeva v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 378, 387 (2007), aff’d, 524 F.3d 
denied, 129 S. Ct. 1315 (2009). 
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All of the victims identified by the Southern Border Communities Coalition 
and the ACLU are residents and citizens of Mexico with few, if any,
“substantial connections” to the U.S.  The courts should not allow such an
arbitrary and ambiguous limit to bar plaintiffs from pursuing judicial
recourse. The Fifth Circuit rightly held that the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments protect excludable aliens against excessive force when
unjustifiably beaten by CBP agents outside the port of entry, but still
technically within the territory of the U.S.206  Analogously, U.S. airports
are the functional equivalents to port of entries at the border, and an
international traveler would not doubt that he has a tort claim against a 
Transportation Security Administration (“TSA”) agent for use of excessive 
force in conducting a search or seizure at the airport or on the airplane
prior to disembarking.  While an international traveler waits to be formally 
admitted to the U.S., he should be able to claim protection of the
Constitution.207 
2. Special Factors 
In Bivens, the Supreme Court warned that the existence of “special
factors counseling hesitation” may thwart the application of a Bivens 
action.208 The Court suggested that “special factors” arise when new
damages claims could impose an unreasonable burden on the federal 
government or when the constitutional violation interferes with
Congressional plenary power.209  In the border context, there are multiple
credible “special factors” that could preclude a Bivens remedy, but such 
factors are not insurmountable.210 
First, the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the long-standing 
principle that the power to defend and regulate the nation’s border is an
inherent power derived from America’s independence as a sovereign 
nation.211 The promulgation and regulation of America’s national
 206. Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618, 626–27 (5th Cir. 2006). 
207. See Pellegrino v. U.S. Transp. Sec. Admin., 855 F. Supp. 2d 343 (E.D. Penn. 
2012).
208. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 
403 U.S. 388, 396 (1971). 
209. Id. at 396–97; Hefland, supra note 81, at 113–20. 
210. Brown, supra note 65, at 842. 
211. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Co., 299 U.S. 304, 315–18 (1936); 
see also THOMAS A. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP PROCESS AND 
POLICY 191–96 (Thomas Reuters 7th ed 2012). 
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immigration laws fall squarely within Congress’s constitutional purview 
and plenary power.212 Any intrusion into immigration regulation may 
therefore constitute a “special factor” that would dissuade the court from 
recognizing a Bivens action along the border.  Thus, the likelihood that 
courts will create a Bivens action in the border context will depend on 
whether courts find an action by noncitizens against CBP agents poses a
real risk of hindering the Executive’s power to direct national security 
initiatives and Congress’s plenary power to regulate immigration.213 
Arguably, it does not.
Excessive force claims have become routine in U.S. courts and the 
location of the violation should not diminish the individual right that is 
disregarded. Recently, in the War on Terror context, federal courts have
treated the “special factors” analysis as a separation of powers issue that 
requires courts to give greater deference than usual to the political
branches.214  In those cases, the doctrine of separation of powers requires 
the Court to tread carefully when exercising judicial review of the
Executive’s war power and national security stratagem.215  Some courts
have cautioned that judicial review of “matters touching upon foreign
policy and national security fall within ‘an area of executive action in 
which courts have long been hesitant to intrude’ absent congressional
authorization.”216  Moreover, at least one scholar and one court have
expressly stated that a judicially created Bivens suit for war on terror
plaintiffs is inappropriate in the military context and public policy concerns 
decidedly weigh in favor of a Congressional remedy.217  The Second Circuit 
warned that creating a damages remedy for victims of military operations 
could incidentally “enmesh the courts ineluctably in an assessment of the 
validity and rationale of that policy and its implementation in this
particular case, matters that directly affect significant diplomatic and
national security concerns.”218  Therefore, “[t]he gravity of the separation- 
of-powers issues raised by [the War on Terror] cases”219 requires the
Court to consider the “practical obstacles” to judicial review, including 
whether “adjudicating [a claim] would cause friction with the host 
212. Hefland, supra note 81, at 113–17; see also Margulies, supra note 29, at 331– 
32. 
213. Hefland, supra note 81, at 111–12. 
214. Brown, supra note 65, at 878. 
215.  Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 770 (2008). 
216. Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 575 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing Lincoln v. Vigil, 
508 U.S. 182, 192, (1993)).
217. Brown, supra note 65, at 904–11; Arar, 585 F.3d at 581. 
218. Arar, 585 F.3d at 575; see also Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 279–80
(E.D.N.Y. 2006). 
219. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 772. 
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government,”220 compromise a “military mission,” or impose logistical
constraints on the “Executive[‘s] substantial authority to apprehend and 
detain those who pose a real danger to our security.”221 
However, the border context does not implicate separation of powers 
concerns in the same way. While it is true that the U.S. remains involved in
the “war on drugs”222 and national security includes border defense and 
enforcement, it is still possible to meaningfully distinguish the role of 
CBP agents in policing the borders and the role of military forces in
counter-terrorism operations abroad.  Where federal courts have rightly
shied away from reviewing individual acts stemming from War on Terror 
policies,223 federal courts, including the Supreme Court, have always
been willing to review constitutional questions of law raised by aliens,
even when they have not exhausted their administrative remedies under
the Immigration and Nationality Act.224  Moreover, the “hands-off”
approach in the War on Terror cases has drawn criticism from scholars 
who argue that”a [federal] official should not be able to use the ‘factor 
counseling hesitation’ prong of Bivens to insulate conduct by slapping a
‘national security’ label on a challenged decision.”225 Similarly, CBP
agents should not be immune from constitutional tort litigation solely 
because they are stationed at the border.  Unlike our nation’s military 
officers, who are routinely confronted with complex situations with a 
direct effect on our country’s foreign affairs, CBP agents are tasked with 
responsibilities more akin to regular law enforcement.  Where a court 
would refuse to review discretionary conduct on the battlefield, courts 
routinely review excessive force claims against state police under Section 
1983 actions.226 
Notwithstanding Congress’s obvious dominion over immigration, some
scholars contend that it may be possible to carve out a Bivens action for 
220. Id. at 770. 
221. Id. at 797. 
222. Philip Mayor, Note, Borderline Constitutionalism: Reconstructing and
Deconstructing Judicial Justifications for Constitutional Distortion in the Border Region, 
46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 647, 649 (2011). 
223. Brown, supra note 65, at 871. 
224.  8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) (2006). 
225. Margulies, supra note 29, at 342. 
226. Scott J. Borrowman, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain and Abu Ghraib—Civil Remedies
for Victims of Extraterritorial Torts by U.S. Personnel and Civilian Contractors, 2005 B.Y.U.
L. REV. 371, 380–83 (2005). 
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egregious constitutional violations.227  In these more exceptional cases, 
the court would not defer to Congress’s plenary power when a federal
agent’s act is so unconstitutional such that it places it outside the boundaries
of Congressional approbation.228  Already, the Fifth Circuit has held that
even “excludable aliens are entitled under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to be free of gross physical abuse at the hands . . . of
federal officials.”229  Despite recent decisions that limit the substantive
rights of resident aliens, it is easy to imagine that the use of excessive,
deadly force along the border by federal agents can run so afoul of the 
Constitution as to warrant judicial intervention.  Additionally, it is unlikely
that a Bivens action against a federal CBP agent acting in their individual 
capacity would create the financial burden that would counsel against
providing a damages remedy since only the agent, not the federal 
government, would pay for the agent’s negligence.230  As Justice Kennedy 
pointed out in Boumediene, “[c]ompliance with any judicial process
requires some incremental expenditure of resources,”231 but that such 
cost concerns cannot outweigh adjudication of substantive rights.
3. Qualified Immunity 
Finally, it should be noted that even when an individual, citizen or not, 
can establish the prerequisites for a Bivens action, he must still overcome 
the federal official’s defense of qualified immunity, which permits liability
only if the official has acted in violation of settled law.232  Similar to the
excessive force analysis, for a plaintiff to pierce qualified immunity, the
federal official must have violated a “clearly established” constitutional
right233 that a reasonable person would have recognized.  Moreover,
recent court decisions have narrowly construed the “clearly established 
law” element to require “precedents that precisely match the fact pattern
in the case at bar.”234  While the Supreme Court has never clearly defined 
what “clearly established” means, it “has almost always required 
227. See Hefland, supra note 81, at 114–15; Margulies, supra note 29, at 323. 
228. See Hefland, supra note 81, at 114–15; Margulies, supra note 29, at 323; see
also Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896). 
229. Hefland, supra note 81, at 117 (citing Lynch v. Cannatella, 810 F.2d 1363, 
1374 (5th Cir. 1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
230. Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Success of Bivens Litigation and Its 
Consequences for the Individual Liability Model, 62 STAN. L. REV. 809, 847–50 (2010). 
231.  Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 769 (2008). 
232. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982); Pearson v. Callahan, 555
U.S. 223 (2009). 
233. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817; see also Margulies, supra note 29, at 337–39. 
234. Margulies, supra note 29, at 337; see also John C. Williams, Qualifying
Qualified Immunity, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1305–09 (2012). 
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specificity.”235  Therefore, noncitizen plaintiffs must still prove that a
right is “clearly established” by demonstrating either evidence of a
“substantial connection” or extraterritorial application of the Constitution.236 
4. Bivens: Still the Best Option 
Despite the lament of many scholars, of the uneven and sometimes
“ad hoc” fashion in which Bivens jurisprudence has developed over the 
years,237 has long suggested that damages remedies are the most effective
means to deter governmental misconduct and increase overall 
accountability.238  While access to the judicial system in no way guarantees
relief, the stability and transparency of the judicial process has several
advantages over the political process.  In fact, the Supreme Court in
Carlson reasoned that a Bivens claim brought against an individual federal
officer was more effective than the FTCA in deterring violations of the 
Constitution.239  The crux of the issue remains whether it is possible to 
provide a Bivens action in the limited context of the border without
unintended consequences in other areas of law. 
The Hernandez family, and others similarly injured in border torts,
have reason to expect that CBP agents should be held responsible for 
reckless behavior and use of excessive force, especially when such acts
result in the loss of life. But is it possible for courts to fashion a remedy
for trans-border torts without imposing liability on the U.S. Government 
for its conduct abroad, including an erroneous drone strike in a foreign 
country?  The most viable judicial option is to craft a circumscribed 
Bivens action along the border for only the most egregious harms, such
as excessive force and the deprivation of life.  The possibility of individual 
civil liability for egregious violations could provide the deterrent needed for
CBP agents to think twice before resorting to deadly force.  Granted, the 
exigencies of national security and public safety oppose providing a 
Bivens remedy for noncitizens against CBP agents, but not doing anything 
is equally unacceptable. The purpose of the Bivens remedy is to allow 
235. Williams, supra note 234, at 1304–05. 
236. See Carvalho, supra note 13, at 255–58.
 237. Bernstein, supra note 196, at 720; see also Margulies, supra note 29, at 320– 
24. 
238. Hefland, supra note 81, at 119–22. 
239. Lee J. Teran, Obtaining Remedies for INS Misconduct, 96-05 IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 1 
(1996). 
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V. NON-JUDICIAL REMEDIES: IF NOT BIVENS, THEN WHAT? 
An assessment of alternative non-judicial remedies is necessary to
provide a complete understanding of the choices facing future litigants if
courts refuse to act.  Such an assessment reveals why a Bivens action is 
still the best option for achieving greater transparency and compliance 
among CBP agents. 
A. Bilateral International Agreements with Mexico
Stepping away from the merits of the Hernandez litigation, there may
be alternative means to increase accountability and reduce human rights 
violations at the border.  Before the judiciary creates a common-law remedy 
for noncitizens, the United States and Mexico should work harder to 
fulfill existing international obligations.  Prompted by the increase in
violent and deadly confrontations between Mexican nationals and CBP 
agents, the U.S. and Mexico signed the Joint Statement of the Merida
Initiative High-Level Consultative Group on Bilateral Cooperation against
Transnational Organized Crime in March 2010, as well as the Border
Violence Prevention Protocols.240  These initiatives expound a commitment 
to shared governance and responsibility along the border.  While neither 
initiative provides for any bilateral judicial mechanism to adjudicate 
claims that arise along the border, a bilateral agreement that delineates a 
judicial procedure for trans-border crimes or violations would definitely 
be afforded greater deference by the judiciary in the U.S.  In fact, treaties
between nations are considered the supreme law of the land and may 
confer on Congress the power to pass laws or create procedures to
implement the treaty.241  Because “the Mexican and U.S. governments
are equally responsible for the violence at the U.S.-Mexico border,” a 
joint partnership is critical to mounting a united front against external
threats while ensuring the safety of their respective citizens.242  However, 
the Mexican Government points to the number of violent shootings 
along the border as proof of the failure of the U.S. Government to
 240. Press Release, U.S. Department of State, Joint Statement on U.S.-Mexico
Merida High-Level Consultative Group on Bilateral Cooperation Against Transnational
Criminal Organizations (Apr. 29, 2011), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/
04/162245.htm [hereinafter United States-Mexico Joint Statement]. 
241.  State of Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 431–33 (1920). 
242. See Carvalho, supra note 13, at 261. 
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uphold the promises it made in the Joint Declaration.  For instance the 
U.S. Government agreed to,
[m]inimize the need for United States and Mexican federal law enforcement 
officers to resort to lethal force, and ensure that such use of force is consistent
with the policies and standards of our respective agencies and in compliance 
with bilateral law and international instruments to which the United States and
Mexico are both parties.243 
But the U.S. Government’s repeated refusal to prosecute individual CBP
agents has further strained the U.S.-Mexico relationship.  When the DOJ 
announced it would not go forward with the investigation into Sergio’s 
death, the Mexican Government reiterated its request for the U.S. to 
extradite the federal agent involved in the incident.244 Despite the U.S.’s
most recent denial to extradite Agent Mesa, the Mexican government
has made repeated, albeit unsuccessful, requests for extradition of federal
agents in the past.245  President Calderon publicly criticized the U.S.’s
approach, saying, “how many Americans have heard of Guillermo Arévalo 
Pedroza? He was killed earlier this month by a bullet fired from a U.S.
Border Patrol boat while picnicking with his wife and two young girls on
the south side of the Rio Grande, near Laredo, Texas.”246  He decried the
fact that “nothing happened in the legal institutions of [the U.S.]”247 
Calderon’s jab at the American judicial system expresses the view held by
many Mexicans of the hypocrisy of the U.S. Government’s actions— 
earnestly prosecuting nonviolent undocumented aliens yet refusing to 
prosecute one of its own employees. 
Not surprisingly, many international observers and commentators are 
enraged that CBP agents involved in deadly clashes are often returned to
the field after spending only three to four days on administrative duty.248 
243.  United States-Mexico Joint Statement, supra note 240. 
244. Press Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mex., The Mexican Gov’t 
Disagrees with the U.S. Justice Dep’ts Decision Not to Prosecute the Border Patrol Agent
Who Shot a Mexican Teen (Apr. 29, 2012); see also Marisela Ortega Lozano & Aaron 
Bracamontes,Chihuahua officials seek extradition of border agent in the ‘10 shooting
death of teenager, EL PASO TIMES (May 4, 2012, 8:32 AM), http://www.elpasotimes.com/
news/ci_20544250/extradition-border-agent-sought. 
245. See Brief for the Government of Mexico, supra note 149. 
246. Bret Stephens, Stephens: The Paradoxes of Felipe Calderón, WALL ST. J., 
Sept. 29, 2012, at A15. 
247. Id. 
248. Ramon Bracamontes, Border Patrol Agent Who Shot Boy Is Back on Duty, EL 
PASO TIMES (Aug. 25, 2010, 12:00 AM), http://www.elpasotimes.com/news/ci_15883524. 
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In fact, several members of Congress, the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights,
and the Southern Border Communities Coalition have demanded a
comprehensive, independent investigation of CBP policies and practices.249 
When it comes to human life, activists claim that “[i]t’s not sufficient for 
there to be enforceable standards . . . it’s not enough that border patrol have 
a complaint process, it’s not enough that there be an internal DGS process, 
because it’s clear that none of those mechanisms are sufficient.”250 
In addition to promoting a thorough vetting of the agency’s use of force 
policies, training, and complaint processes, there is widespread support
among advocates for a “permanent, arm’s-length oversight commission
for CBP.”251  The frequency of violent cross-border incidents has tarnished
the CBP’s reputation internationally.252  Civil rights organizations recommend
CBP engage with the public and take suggestions to implement the best 
law enforcement practices, including improved training of CBP agents 
by prioritizing de-escalation techniques, as well as equipping agents with 
protective gear that reduces their risk of injury and corresponding need
to use potentially deadly force.253  Without proper oversight of the actions
of CBP officers and investigations of human rights complaints, “the number 
of migrant killings and incidents of extreme and unwarranted violence 
[will] continue to rise.”254 




An alternative non-judicial remedy to improving transparency and 
accountability among the CBP’s rank and file employees is an improved 
administrative complaint procedure coupled with an operative internal 
discipline system that punishes the “rotten apples” of the CBP. For
decades, civil and human rights organizations have criticized the CBP’s
administrative complaint procedure as being both an ineffective deterrent
against border patrol misconduct and partly responsible for continued 
249. Press Release, ACLU, Border Patrol Must Stop Hiding the Truth About Its
Uses of Force (Oct. 4, 2012); Press Release, ACLU, A Cause for Alarm: ACLU Tells
UN Panel of Rampant Abuse by Out-of-Control Border Patrol (Oct. 26, 2012). 
250. Deadly Patrols, supra note 24, at 2. 
251. Press Release, ACLU, Border Patrol Must Stop Hiding the Truth About Its
Uses of Force (Oct. 4, 2012). 
252. See NO MORE DEATHS, A CULTURE OF CRUELTY: ABUSE AND IMPUNITY IN
SHORT-TERM U.S. BORDER PATROL CUSTODY (2011).
253. Border Patrol Must Stop Hiding the Truth About Its Uses of Force, supra note 
251. 
254. John Carlos Frey, What’s going on with Border Patrol?, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2012, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/apr/20/opinion/la-oe-frey-border-patrol-violence-20120420. 
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abuse and human rights violations.255 The administrative complaint 
procedure is the process by which the CBP receives, investigates, and
addresses complaints of abuse by its CBP agents.256  The internal complaint 
review system in place before 9/11 was often denounced by scholars and
human rights organizations as hindered by its bias, cronyism, and 
bureaucratic apathy.257  After many prior failed attempts, the most
encouraging reform of the administrative complaint review process
occurred after 9/11, when Congress established the Office for Civil
Rights and Civil Liberties (“CRCL”) within the DHS.258  This new branch 
has the authority to investigate complaints, provide policy advice to
DHS leadership and its subdivisions on civil rights and civil liberties 
issues, and communicate with the public about CRCL and its activities.259 
The current procedure still fails to curb official misconduct and
illegitimate uses of force despite its broad grant of discretionary authority
and structural overhaul of the complaint process.260  The process fails to 
achieve its goals for many of the same reasons it has always failed.
Undocumented immigrants, who suffer the brunt of human rights
abuses, do not file complaints for fear of prosecution or retaliation. 
Additionally, attempts by advocates to use the Freedom of Information
Act to begin an investigation into the use of force policies of the CBP 
have been unsuccessful.  Furthermore, when it comes to allegations of
excessive force, as in the Hernandez case, the low rate of prosecution for 
civil rights abuses only discourages potential complainants because they 
believe the complaint procedure to be futile.  According to the CRCL’s 
third quarterly report to Congress, fifty-three investigations of excessive
force were under way by June 30, 2012 with nineteen of those being new 
255. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BRUTALITY UNCHECKED: HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES
ALONG THE U.S. BORDER WITH MEXICO (1992).
256. Jesus A. Trevino, Border Violence Against Illegal Immigrants and the Need to
Change the Border Patrol’s Current Complaint Review Process, 21 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 85, 
109 (1998).
257. Id. at 110–11; see also Bill Ong Hing, Border Patrol Abuse: Evaluating Complaint 
Procedures Available to Victims, 9 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 757, 779–99 (1995). 
258.  6 U.S.C. § 113 (d)(3) (2012). 
259.  6 U.S.C. § 345(a)(6) (2012). 
260. Letter from Jose E. Serrano, et al., Member of Cong., to Janet Napolitano, 
Sec’y of the Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (May 10, 2012), available at http://serrano.house.gov/
press-release/16-members-congress-call-justice-hernandez-rojas-case/. 
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investigations opened in 2012.261  The higher numbers of complaints
indicate that use of excessive force remains a problem for Border Patrol. 
But the higher numbers also may demonstrate an increased willingness 
of citizens and noncitizens to file complaints and hold CBP agents
accountable. 
Most recently, in response to another deadly shooting along the border
in October 2012, the Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector
General launched a probe into the agency’s lethal force policies.262  The
Mexican Government is encouraged by this recent development and future
plaintiffs should be encouraged as well.  Hopefully, this investigation 
will lead to fundamental changes in the agency’s firearms policies and
agency training programs. 
VI. CONCLUSION
Until 2001, no noncitizen had pursued a Bivens remedy in U.S. courts.263 
By 2013, over 200 noncitizens had initiated Bivens suits against federal 
officials.  However, to date none of these suits have prevailed on the 
merits of the claims.  The only Bivens suit the federal court did not
dismiss on jurisdictional grounds concluded in a settlement.264  Without
admitting fault, the U.S. Government has repeatedly paid out hundreds 
of thousands of dollars to settle wrongful death actions along the border, 
including one settlement in which the family received $850,000.265  These
numbers should provide cautious optimism for future plaintiffs because
they indicate the U.S. Government’s acknowledgement for the need to 
compensate noncitizen victims.  Moreover, lobbying efforts aimed at the 
Executive that demand review of DHS internal policies have also been 
successful.266 
Sergio’s case will be the first Bivens action by a noncitizen after the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Boumediene.  It will also be the first to argue
for the implementation of a functional approach when applying the 
261. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS, THIRD QUARTER FISCAL YEAR 2012, at 11–13 (Oct. 3, 
2012), available at http://www.dhs.gov/reports-office-civil-rights-and-civil-liberties. 
262. Border Patrol Under Scrutiny for Deadly Force, USA TODAY (Nov. 24, 2012, 
8:59 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2012/11/14/border-patrol-probe/ 
1705737/.
263. Hefland, supra note 81, at 107. 
264. Joint Stipulation of Dismissal, Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, No. EP-03-CV­
0411 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 12, 2007). 
265. Border Patrol Under Scrutiny for Deadly Force, supra note 262. 
266. Sarah Childress, Amind Criticism, Border Patrol to Change Use-of-Force
Policy, Frontline (Sept. 25, 2013, 4:05 PM), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/ 
criminal-justice/amid-criticism-border-patrol-to-change-use-of-force-policy/. 
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Constitution to the border zone.  While controlling precedent may compel 
the Fifth Circuit to dismiss the action on jurisdictional grounds, the action 
must proceed if the courts are to stay true to the tenets of the Constitution 
and the rationale behind Bivens. Something must change along the border
to stop the stream of violent and deadly shootings.  As U.S. Senator John
Cornyn once said, “[u]nless and until Congress addresses the immigration 
problem across the board, we will continue to experience an unacceptable
level of violence along the border.”267
 267. Carvalho, supra note 13, at 266. 
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